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Abstract  
In this paper the issue from personnel economics such as work intensity has been investigated.  
George Akerlof back in 1976 argued that the real life failed to correspond to the standard 
general equilibrium model set by Arrow-Debreu. In the real life information is neither complete 
nor it’s costless. In real life workers tend to work in harsh conditions, and put more efforts in 
order to receive better wages, also they have incentives to educate themselves more, as better 
educated employees are more productive. More productive means that they work faster as the 
rat’s race to the cheese and faster rats will get to the cheese first and get more cheese than 
slower rats. In reality workers do not want to share their output with slower workers. But it is 
because of bad norms that firms sets or taxes that government imposes that workers tend to 
work suboptimal i.e. work more than what is required in equilibrium, or work less than the 
equilibrium socially optimal required effort. The problem also arises when firms compare 
worker and pick ‘’average’’ worker, nowadays in OECD (rich) countries club, workers tend to 
get paid more and get spurious data on increased productivity and the measure average effort to 
be biased, so wage function will then be biased w=w (ē, t), wage is function of average effort 
and time needed to produce output.  
Keywords: Rat race equilibrium, labour market regulation policies, job satisfaction, workers 
performance 
JEL codes: M50, M51, M52 
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    1. Outline of the alternative explanations for the apparent increase in intensity of work 
examined by Green (2004).And examination of the degree of empirical support for six 
hypotheses. 
Green argues that one important explanation for intensification of work lays in technological 
changes of recent decades like “just in time” (JIT) production methods and total quality 
management (TQM), which reduce monitoring cost and which are effort biased that is to say; they 
have increased the marginal productivity of change. Second aspect of JIT and TQM production 
methods is that closer matching  between available labour with required workflow has its 
consequence to make better productive use of workers as long they supply high effort, while  
the productivity of low effort workers remained the same or raised much less. High-commitment 
Human Resource Policies .Human Resource Management and work effort . 
These techniques aimed at increased commitment by employees, which is manifested in 
increased levels of effort. Effort incentives By offering appropriate rewards (performance related 
pay, bonuses, effort related promotion), employers can induce employees to supply higher levels 
of effort. Declining Union Power and Raising Job Insecurity which says firms found themselves to 
reduce costs and raise quality when union power is lower; also work intensification is adjunct of 
a job loss brought by declining benefit/wage ratio and Sectorial differences manifested in declining  
public to private sector workers average pay.  
From the preceding discussion Greene proposes following six hypotheses that work is more 
likely to have been  intensified at workplaces : 1.that experienced technical and organizational 
changes  2.that have introduced multiskilling and improved task flexibility.3.that have initiated 
human resources management techniques designed to endanger greater worker 
involvement.4.that have increased their usage of effort incentives.5.wher the power unions have 
decrease 6.where there is rising job  insecurity. To test this hypothesis Green used data from 
cross-sectional Workplace Employee Relations Survey (1998). He specifies model2 where 
dependent variable change in effort is regressed on the variables change in: technology, 
flexibility, high involvement policies, effort incentives, union power and insecurity. In Table 4 3 
Column (1) shows that technical innovations and changes in work organization have positive 
and significant effect on work intensification in small establishments and large establishments in 
service sector, consistent with [hypothesis 1], also Column (2) shows strong link between 
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increases in task flexibility and work intensification consistent with [hypothesis 2] but reduces 
the significance of the coefficients. 
 While the role of changes in work organization, is evident in small establishments especially in 
production sector .The introduction of high-commitment (involvement initiatives and 
performance related pay) policies have positive and significant effect in small service enterprises, 
and performance related is indeed significant factor in large production establishments 
consistent with[hypotheses 3&4]. Finding shows that there are different factors that determine 
effort in small and large establishments. The decline in use of collective bargaining has expected 
positive association with work intensification consistent with [hypotheses 5]. Still, the impact is 
not all that well defined because variable is specified too general.  
Use of Fix-term workers and part time workers is not associated with effort increase, while use 
of temporary workers and contractors show has an association with effort increase in larger and 
in small production establishments, but not in small service sector establishments. This provides 
weak support for a link between insecurity and hard work consistent with [Hypotheses 6].Work 
intensification is higher in public and in service sector than in private sector. From Table 6 
(according to 33.5% managers and 26.3%workplace representatives) introduction of new 
technology is the main factor of effort change, followed  by changes in work organization which 
are two most important set of factors that can be identified as having raised work intensity. 
2.  Why does Clark (2005) suggest that the recent rise in real wages and lower working 
hours in most OECD countries may provide a false image of overall labour market 
performance and job quality? 
Clark (2005) suggests that concentration on rise in real wages and lower working hours can give 
biased picture of how jobs are perceived by the workers. Overall job satisfaction can be usefully 
thought as a weighted sum of Job Outcomes. The weights are Job Values, which refer to how 
much workers care about the different job outcomes. Survey data (International Social Survey 
Programme-ISSP) in table 24 showed that workers (Men& Women), rate Job security and Job 
interest as most important job values. Table 3 shows security as most preferable outcome. Clark 
(2005) uses two sets of data: ISSP multy-country and repeated cross-section and British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) ; single –country panel.  
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In Table 4(ISSP), is designed to find out whether overall job satisfaction is higher in 1997 than 
it was in 1989.In the equation are included set of structural variables such as sex, age, and 
education. In addition there are country dummies and dummy variable for 1997. Also, wage data 
are not available for Netherlands in 1997; hours are not available for Hungary in 1989. 
Therefore there are two specifications: one with and one without wages and hours. The results 
in column 1 show that coefficient on “1997” variable is negative ,but insignificant, in this 
column hours and income are not controlled for. This coefficient on 1997 variable is negative 
and significant in column 2; an employee with same hours and real wage is less satisfied in 1997 
than in 1989.In Table 5 takes various measures of job outcome such as: high income, hours 
preferences, advancement opportunities, secure job, hard work, good job content, good 
relations at work again there are used two specifications. In row 1 are reproduce the estimated 
coefficients on the 1997 year dummy form Table 4, hours preference variable is ordered, higher 
values indicate relative desire for greater hours of work. These findings are similar to base 
regression, and show that in seven OECD countries, there is little evidence of rise in job quality. 
Equality feeling of job security fell between 1989 and 1997 and there is no significant change in 
job content. In this regression a number of measures of job quality have trended downwards.  
In Table 6(BHPS) first column shows results from ordered probit estimation of pooled data(as 
if each observation comes from a different individual) and second column panel data(same 
individuals are interviewed every year),the estimated coefficients on wave dummies are all 
negative and jointly significant suggesting overall decline in job satisfaction,1992 is a base year. 
Results in regressions that are done for other job outcomes and the results are more lees the 
same in the regressions that do not control for hours. There is negative correlation between job 
satisfaction and firm size, and job satisfaction minimizes at about 40 in pooled regression. 
 
3. What is meant by the term rat race equilibrium in Lander et al.? What are the 
characteristics of large law firms that favour such equilibrium? 
”Rat race” equilibrium is a suboptimum situation in which employees work inefficiently long 
hours. Given that firms use willingness to work long hours, as an indicator for hiring or 
promoting employees, issues on adverse selection and asymmetric information may appear in 
determination of work hours. Employees desiring short hours will have an incentive to 
camouflage themselves as long hour-worker accepting to work longer they prefer. Firms will 
respond by establishing work norms with hours long enough to discourage a shot-hour 
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employee from pretending to be long-run employee. The result is that employees will work 
inefficiently long hours; opposite of full information equilibrium situation (Stiglitz 1976); when 
no actor has incentive to alter his behaviour. Now they will work more hours then utility 
maximizing number of hours conditional on their wage. Large law firm have simple internal 
structure i.e. associates and partners.  
Promotion decision allows associates to purchase an equity stake in the enterprise. Second and 
more important feature is that there is always some degree of revenue sharing among partners. 
Income sharing characteristics of partnerships creates strong incentives to screen potential 
partners for their propensity to work hard. Rat race equilibrium is expected in any group where 
group members benefit from the productivity of other group members, the output of the group 
can be significantly influenced by the work effort of individual members and where the 
members of group can establish norms. In Table 25 nearly2/3 (65.41%) of the associates 
indicated they would prefer reducing work hours and keeping income unchanged over the coming 
year. Only 25,56% of respondents wanted to keep hours unchanged and enjoy 5% raise in 
income.  
The statistics in Table 2 is not consistent with the conventional labour supply model when a 
large fraction of associate lawyers are on the backward bending portion of their labour supply 
curves. However, in the model labour supply elasticity is 10 times larger than reported in the 
literature. Second, backward bending labour supply curve suggests that associates should cut 
back their hours as wage rise. In the surveyed firms salaries increase by 7% per year, but there is 
no evidence of reduction o billable and non-billable hours among the senior associates. Third, 
backward bending supply curve suggests associates who want to reduce their hours have, on 
average, higher income than associates who want to keep their current hours. The data suggests 
that average income for these two groups is virtually identical. In Panel A(Preferences when 
others increase hours by 5%) in Table 7 we observed that significant number of respondents 
wanted to increase the desired level of work hours if others were doing the same. 
 Indeed the hypothesis that the distribution of original hour’s preferences was identical with the 
distribution of preferences when other associates increase work hours is strongly rejected. In 
Panel B (Preferences when others reduce hours by 5%).The associates who like their current 
hours and the desirability of these hours only increased as others reduce hours. And only small 
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portion of associates changed their choice. This is consistent with the explanation that associates 
want to work long hours (Rat race equilibrium hypothesis). Alternatively the explanation might 
be in the coordination problem; i.e. .when associates are working face- to- face 5% increase in 
working hours would require other group members to increase hours 5%.Which is not possible 
because the type of activity consist of solitary library work on legal research in writing and this 
does not require face-to-face contact. 
4. Summary and answer to a question: Can, and should, labour market regulation or 
other policies address this issue? 
Technical innovations and new forms of organization have been associated with greater 
managerial control over the labour process which can bring higher effort levels and are effort 
biased i.e. productivity is more dependent upon the effort level. Second explanation of work 
intensification is the use of high commitment policies, and decline in collective bargaining which 
is found to raise effort. 
 Job values Clark (2005) shows that are stable, so they are unlikely to explain movements in 
overall job satisfaction. Overall measures of job outcomes are either flat or falling, despite 
favourable movements in hours, wages, and job security. Third, there is no evidence of 
increasing inequality in some measures of job outcomes, as revealed by index of ordinal 
variation. Also there is no further erosion in job satisfaction gap between union members and 
non-members in Great Britain, except job security on the union member’s side. Satisfaction with 
work itself has moved sharply downwards Good jobs are being replaced by the bad jobs due to 
changes in job content.  
Another suboptimal solution is “Rat Race” equilibrium when employees work inefficiently long 
hour’s conditional on their wages. Since the overall effect will have detrimental effect upon 
welfare society labour market regulatory policy should address these issues. Overworking can be 
restricted by setting maximum hours. The inefficient mix of job outcomes should be changed by 
increasing the efficacy of   Job security and Job Interest, which are valued higher by workers. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1 Table 4  
Determinants of Work Intensification , 1993-1998 
  (1)Small (2)Small (3)Large (4)Large 
(5)Production 
small 
(6)Productio
n large 
(7)Service 
small 
(8)Service                                            
large 
Technologica
l change    
Technical 
innovation 
0.158* 
(0.086) 
0.113 
(0.085) 
0.312*** 
(0.086) 
0.272*** 
(0.087) 
0.319 
(0.226) 
0.312* 
(0.180) 
0.146 
(0.092) 
0.311*** 
(0.098) 
New work 
organization 
0.289*** 
(0.088) 
0.199*** 
(0.094) 
0.101 
(0.097) 
0.053 
(0.100) 
0.477* 
(0.245) 
0.012 
(0.218) 
0.258*** 
(0.097) 
0.143 
(0.106) 
Greater task 
flexibilty   
0.494*** 
(0.087)   
0.401*** 
(0.090)         
High 
commitment    
Involvement 
0.289*** 
(0.088) 
0.275*** 
(0.089) 
0.018 
(0.080) 
0.005 
(0.081) 
0.321 
(0.217) 
0.118 
(0.167) 
0.291*** 
(0.095) 
 -0.031 
(0.092) 
More use of 
performance 
related pay 
0.267*** 
(0.090) 
0.196** 
(0.090) 
0.150* 
(0.080) 
0.118 
(0.080) 
0.620*** 
(0.204) 
0.041 
(0.152) 
0.228*** 
(0.101) 
0.171* 
(0.094) 
Workforce 
structures   
Less 
bargaining 
0.247* 
(0.146) 
0.222 
(0.148) 
0.211* 
(0.114) 
0.194* 
(0.113) 
0.190 
(0.314) 
0.266 
(0.220) 
0.272 
(0.173) 
0.195 
(0.134) 
Increases in 
use of   
Fix-term 
workers 
 - 0.037 
(0.109) 
 - 0.011 
(0.108) 
0.023 
(0.089) 
0.024 
(0.089) 
0.063 
(0.267) 
 -0.069 
( 0.182) 
 -0.059 
(0.116) 
0.078 
(0.101) 
Temporary 
workers  
0.198* 
(0.116) 
0.195* 
(0.117) 
0.189** 
(0.088) 
0.196** 
(0.089) 
 -0.205 
(0.263) 
0.270* 
(0.163) 
0.278** 
(0.134) 
0.162 
(0.104) 
Contractors 
 -0.008 
(0.093) 
 -0.039 
(0.094) 
 0.321*** 
(0.085) 
0.309*** 
(0.086) 
0.555* 
(0.284) 
0.312** 
(0.156) 
 -0.068 
(0.097) 
0.313*** 
(0.101) 
Part time 
workers  
0.062 
(0.085) 
0.022 
(0.085) 
0.093 
(0.079) 
0.101 
(0.079) 
0.033 
(0.243) 
0.045 
(0.168) 
0.103 
(0.091) 
0.105 
(0.088) 
Other   
Privatized 
firm  
0.679 
(0.615) 
0.809 
(0.545) 
0.971* 
(0.522) 
0.989** 
(0.502)         
Public sector 
0.389*** 
(0.099) 
0.421*** 
(0.101) 
0.285*** 
(0.089) 
0.303*** 
(0.089) 
0.451 
(1.035) 
0.212 
(0.465) 
0.369*** 
(0.097) 
0.259*** 
(0.091) 
Production 
sector  
 -0.228** 
(0.102) 
 -0.300*** 
(0.102) 
 -0.247*** 
(0.092) 
 -0.288*** 
(0.092)         
N 857 856 951 951 127 240 742 726 
Pseudo-R-
squared 0.059 0.076 0.049 0.059 0.131 0.035 0.05 0.043 
Wald chi-
square 113.32 143.62 93.85 123.73 31.6 18.7 84.9 62.6 
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Table 6 Changes with greatest impact on Employees: Respondent’s Opinions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 Table 2 Job Values  
Changes in: 
According to 
managers(Percent of 
Establishments) 
According to Workplace 
Representatives(Percent of 
Establishments) 
Payment system 4.5 5.4 
New technology 33.5 26.3 
Working time 
arrangements 
7.8 17.2 
Organization of work 18.6 23.6 
Work techniques and 
procedures 
14.2 18.5 
Introduction of  initiatives 
to involve employees 
11.2 4.1 
Introduction of new 
product or service 
10.3 4.8 
ISSP 1989-1997 
Job values: Percentage Saying "Very Important" 
  Women Men 
  1989 1997 1989 1997 
High 
Income 
19.6 18.2 23.6 21 
Flexible 
working 
hours  
20.3 20.2 14.6 15.5 
Good 
opportunitie
s for work 
23.0 20.2 24.3 20.1 
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advancemen
t 
Job security 58.7 57.7 55.5 55.4 
Interestng job 47.9 47.8 45.3 46.9 
Allows to 
wrok 
independently 29.1 31.3 33.4 33.4 
Allows to 
help other 
people 23.4 25.3 16.5 16.8 
Useful to 
society 25.5 23.9 21.8 16.8 
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Table 2 British Household Panel Survey   
BHPS 1991-1999 
Job values: Percentage Saying CHARACTERISTICS IS MOST IMPORTANT 
  Women Men 
  1991 1999 1991 1999 
Promotion 
prospects 2.1 2.4 3.6 3.3 
Total Pay 13.6 19.1 19.1 25.7 
Good relations 
with manager 10.8 11.3 4.8 5.1 
Job security 24 17.9 35.6 31.1 
Using initiative 7.5 9.9 9.3 10.1 
Actual work  34.4 31.4 24.1 33.4 
Hours worked  6 6.3 1.2 1.2 
Something else  1.6 1.6 2.5 1.6 
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Table3.Job Outcomes  
ISSP 1989-1997 
Job Outcomes :Percentage Reporting characteristics in Question 
  Women Men 
  1989 1997 1989 1997 
Income is high  15.8 16.7 25.6 25.3 
Prefer to spend less 
time in their job 
33.7 40.3 36.2 41.5 
Prefer to spend 
more time in their 
work  
13.5 9.9 11.4 10.8 
Opportunities for 
advancement is 
high 
17.6 17.9 24.3 23 
Job is secure 71.8 66.4 70.9 64.7 
Hard work 35.4 39.2 49.6 48.1 
Good job content  40.6 46.1 38.3 41.6 
Good relations at 
work 
67.0 66.9 65.1 63.8 
High job 
satisfaction 
39.0 39.7 37.7 37.6 
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Table 3 BHPS 1992-1999 
Job Outcomes: Average Satisfaction and Hours preferences 
  Women Men 
  1992 1999 1992 1999 
Satisfaction 
with pay 4.93 5.00 4.56 4.82 
Satisfaction 
with               
security 5.3 5.48 4.88 5.27 
Satisfaction 
with work 
itself 5.78 5.44 5.54 5.31 
Satisfaction 
with hours  5.54 5.30 5.05 4.97 
Overall 
Satisfaction 5.75 5.45 5.27 5.17 
Prefer to 
work fewer 
hours  27.30% 31.90% 32.50% 38.40% 
Prefer to 
work more 
hours  10.90% 7.00% 8.70% 6.50% 
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Table 4. Overall Job Satisfaction Regressions . ISSP 1989-1997 
 
Standard With income and hours 
1997 
-0.032 
(0.022) 
-0.069* 
(0.027) 
Male 
-0.068** 
(0.021) 
-0.149** 
(0.029) 
30 to 44 
0.028 
(0.028) 
0.016 
(0.036) 
45 to 65 
0,.158** 
(0.030) 
0.123** 
(0.038) 
Married 
0.102** 
(0.024) 
0.089** 
(0.030) 
Years of Education 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
Earnings($000)per month - 
0.071** 
(0.016) 
Hour per week - 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
West Germany 
-0.012 
(0.038) 
-0.024 
(0.041) 
Great Britain 
-0.097* 
(0.038) 
-0.084 
(0.040) 
USA 
0.139** 
(0.035) 
0.124** 
(0.038) 
Hungary 
-0.452** 
(0.038)  
Netherlands 
0.109** 
(0.035)  
Italy 
-0.086* 
(0.039) 
-0.119** 
(0.044) 
Observations 10041 6468 
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Log-Likelihood -14301.93 -9302.44 
Log-likelihood at zero -14467.97 -9366.07 
Note : Standard errors in parantheses.* significant at 5%**significant at 1%  
 
Table 5 Estimated Changes over Time in Various Outcome Measures. 
                      ISSP 1989-1997 
Estimated coefficient on "1997" 
  Standard With income and hours 
Job 
satisfaction 
-0.032 
(0.022) 
-0.069* 
(0.027) 
Income is 
high 
-0.042 
(0.022) 
-0.088** 
(0.028) 
Hours 
preferences 
-0.094** 
(0.022) 
-0.094** 
(0.028) 
Opportunities 
for 
advancement 
are high 
-0.010 
(0.022) 
-0.034 
(0.028) 
Job is secure 
-0.213** 
(0.022) 
-0.189** 
(0.028)_ 
Hard work  
0.131** 
(0.024) 
0.159** 
(0.032) 
Good job 
content 
0.007 
(0.023) 
0.005 
(0.029) 
Good 
relations at 
work  
0.014 
(0.026) 
0.047 
(0.033) 
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Table 6 Overall Job Satisfaction Regressions. BHPS 1992-2002 
1993   -0.079*(0.033)  -0.164**(0.042) 
1994    -0.127**(0.033)   -0.241**(0.054) 
1995   -0142**(0.033)   -0.256**(0.069) 
1996    -0.116**(0.032)   -0.231**(0.085) 
1997    -0.067*(0.032)   -0.195(0.103) 
1998     -0.171**(0.032)   -0.278*(0.121) 
1999    -0.204**(0.031)   -0.355*(0.139) 
2000     -0.206**(0.031)   -0.333*(0.157) 
2001     -0.169**(0.031)   -0.307(0.178) 
2002     -0.200***(0.032)    -0.362(0.197) 
Male      -0.208**(0.010)   
Age     -0.061**(0.003)  -0.009(0.021) 
Age-
squared/100 0.079**(0.004) 0.014(0.010) 
High 
educaion    -0.208**(0.014)   
Medium 
education   -0.153**(0.013)   
Separated 0.005(0.031) 0.121*(0.047) 
Divorced   -0.040*(0.017) 0.028(0.039) 
Widowed 0.056(0.040) 0.099(0.103) 
Single   -0.116**(0.014)  -0.094**(0.033) 
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Central 
government  -0.098**(0.023) 0.046(0.049) 
Local 
government 0.083**(0.015) 0.250**(0.035) 
NHS/Higher 
education 0.079**(0.019) 0.261**(0.043) 
Nationalised 
industry   -0.264**(0.049)  -0.076*(0.070) 
Non-profit 0.128**(0.027) 0.272**(0.047) 
Army  -0.010(0.066)  -0.185(0.130) 
Other 0.252**(0.051) 0.199**(0.067) 
Firm size<25 0.174**(0.012) 0.046*(0.020) 
Firm size 25-
199 0.042**(0.011)  -0.004**(0.018) 
Temporary 
job  -0.151**(0.018)  -0.106**(0.026) 
Region 
dummies YES YES 
Number of 
children 
dummies YES YES 
Occupation 
dummies YES YES 
Constant   5867**(0.634) 
Observations 56639 57277 
 Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%**significant at 1% 
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Appendix 3 Table 2-How Associates Would Choose to Use a Hypothetical 5percent wage 
increase* 
 Associates    
Married whose spouse 
work full time  
  
Choices  All With children No Children With Children 
1.Reduce billable and 
nonbillable work hours by 5-
Percent with no change in 
annual salary 
 
percentage 65.41 60.47 78.57 76.19 
Number of associates 87 26 33 16 
2.Continue working the same 
number of hours with a 5-
percent increase in annual 
salary  
 
percentage 25.56 25.56 9.52 23.81 
Number of associates 34 13 4 5 
3.Increase billable and 
nonbillable work hours by 5-
percent increase with a 10-
percent increase in annual 
salary 
 
18 
 
percentage 9.02 9.02 11.90 0.00 
Number of associates 12 4 5 0 
Number of Observations  133 43 42 21 
These results ae response to following question:”This question asks you to consider hypothetical five percent change 
in your work hours over the coming year. You can use the table of the following page to get a sense of what a 5% 
change in work hours may mean for you. Please indicate which of the following alternatives you would be most 
likely to choose “ “The table on the following page refers to a chart that presented following calculation. If an 
associate’s average billable and non-billable work hours total 160 hours per month, then 5-percent change in 
billable and nonbillable hours would be equivalent to an increase of one eight-hour day per month on 12 eight hour 
days over 12 months. Similar calculations were presented for associates working 200,240 and 280 hours per month. 
Panel A : 
Preferences when 
others increase 
hoursb 
Original hour preferences a 
19 
 
 Table 7 –Changes in Hours Preferences of Associates as the Distribution of Hours in the Firm 
Shifts  
a This is how associates would choose to respond to a 5-percent wage increase 
b This is how associates would choose to respond to a 5-percent wage increase if the majority of other associates in 
the firm increased hours by 5 –percent  
c This is how associates would choose to respond to a 5-percent wage increase  if the majority of other associates 
reduced hours by 5 percent. 
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Column total 100.00 100.00 100.000 
Number of 
Observations  50 20 6 
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